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On 30 May 2017, the European Court of Human Rights decided two cases regarding the 
expulsion of rejected asylum seekers by Switzerland to Sudan. In A.I. v. Switzerland, the 
Court held unanimously that there would be a violation of Articles 2 and 3 ECHR in case of 
implementation of the deportation order, whereas in N.A. v. Switzerland the Court, also 
unanimously, did not find a conditional violation of these provisions. 
The judgments (only in French) deserve a blogpost for at least two reasons. First, the Court 
explicitly sets out criteria in order to assess the risk of ill-treatment of political opponents 
when returned to Sudan. Second, the legal reasoning in N.A. v. Switzerland seems to hold 
potential for improvement. This post does not aim to question the outcome in N.A.: even 
though many aspects of A.I. and N.A. run parallel, there are important factual differences that 
may justify finding a violation in one case but not in the other. It does take issue with the way 
this outcome is arrived at in N.A. v. Switzerland. 
Comparing the facts 
Both applicants are Sudanese nationals, whose asylum applications were rejected by the Swiss 
authorities because of lack of credibility. The removal decisions issued against them were 
suspended on the basis of Rule 39 interim measures adopted by the ECtHR. 
The two judgments mainly assess the applicants’ political activities after their arrival in 
Switzerland (sur place). The part of A.I.’s application relating to his flight motives is 
considered manifestly unfounded (§ 37), while as regards N.A., the Court does not identify 
any element that would call into question the credibility assessment carried out by the 
domestic asylum authorities (§ 44). 
In Switzerland, both applicants have been a member for several years of the opposition group 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). A.I. is also a member of the Centre for Peace and 
Development in Darfour (DFEZ). A.I. has been politically more engaged than N.A.: the 
former played a role in organizing weekly sessions of JEM, he participated regularly in events 
of JEM and DFEZ as well as in international conferences on the human rights situation in 
Sudan, he published two articles online criticizing the Sudanese regime, and had become the 
media responsible of the Swiss section of JEM. The latter participated in various meetings and 
public events organized by JEM as well as other organisations regarding the situation in 
Sudan. He also claimed to have regularly assisted the Swiss JEM leader in the preparation of a 
radio program, and that photographs of him with a JEM leader were circulating on the 
internet. 
Comparing the assessments of the merits 
In both cases, new information had come to light after the final decision was taken by the 
domestic authorities, so the Court undertook a full and ex nunc evaluation. 
Regarding the general situation in Sudan, the Court notes in both cases that the human rights 
situation in Sudan is alarming, especially for political opponents. It confirms that the 
individuals at risk are not only high profile opponents, but ‘every person opposing or being 
suspected of opposing the current regime’ (referring to A.A. v. France, § 56; A.F. v. France, § 
49; A.A. v. Switzerland, § 40). Given the difficulties in assessing the genuineness of sur place 
activities, and in view of the importance attached to Article 3 ECHR, the Court assessed the 
applicants’ claims on the grounds of the political activities effectively carried out (referring to 
A.A. v. Switzerland, § 41). 
Considering that the surveillance by the Sudanese secret services of political opponents 
abroad cannot be considered as systematic (referring to A.A. v. Switzerland, § 40 and 
international reports), the Court identifies – for the first time explicitly – four factors to be 
taken into account when assessing the risk faced by political opponents of treatment contrary 
to Article 3 in case of deportation: (i) earlier interest of the Sudanese authorities in the 
individual concerned; (ii) membership of an opposition movement in Sudan and/or abroad, 
the nature of that movement, and the extent to which it is targeted by the government; (iii) the 
nature and degree of political engagement abroad (e.g. participation in meetings or public 
events, online activities); and (iv) personal or family ties with prominent opposition members 
in exile (N.A. § 46; A.I. § 53). The Court  then applies these criteria to the cases at hand (N.A. 
§§ 47-50; A.I. §§ 54-57): 
 As the interest by the Sudanese authorities is concerned, the Court does not find in 
either case an indication of any interest in the applicants by the Sudanese authorities 
during their residence in Sudan or abroad, prior to their arrival in Switzerland. 
 Yet, the Court notes that JEM is one of the main rebellion movements in Sudan and 
that its increased legitimacy in the conflict has provoked a more stringent approach by 
the authorities towards its members. In both cases, the Court concludes that the 
applicants’ membership of JEM since several years ‘thus constitutes a risk factor for 
persecution’. The Court draws the same conclusion as regards A.I.’s membership of 
DFEZ. 
 The main differences between both cases – as regards both facts and legal reasoning – 
concern the nature and level of political activities abroad. The Court first remarks that, 
whereas the political engagement of A.I. had increased over time, this was not the case 
for N.A. In both cases, though, the Court is of the view that the political profile of the 
applicant ‘cannot be considered as very exposed’. Then the two judgements split ways 
as their argumentation is concerned. 
In A.I., the Court states that, notwithstanding the applicant’s low public profile, ‘the specific 
situation in Sudan should be taken into account’. It then refers to the abovementioned case 
law, that not only high-profile opponents face risk of ill-treatment, but any person 
(supposedly) opposing the regime. Moreover, the Court holds, it has been acknowledged that 
the Sudanese government monitors activities of political opponents abroad. 
In N.A., by contrast, the Court justifies the qualification of the applicant’s profile as ‘not very 
exposed’ by referring, among others, to the fact that he did not represent JEM when 
participating in an international event on human rights in Sudan (distinguishing the case from 
A.A. v. Switzerland § 43). The Court therefore concludes that N.A.’s political activities in 
Switzerland, being limited to those of a ‘mere participant’ in events of the opposition, ‘were 
not of the kind to attract the attention of the Sudanese intelligence services’. 
 Finally, the Court finds in both cases that the applicants cannot usefully invoke 
personal or family ties with prominent opposition members in exile. 
The Court concludes in A.I. that it cannot exclude that the applicant, as an individual and 
because of his political activities, has attracted the attention of the Sudanese intelligence 
services. Substantial grounds have thus been shown for believing that A.I., if deported, faces a 
real risk of being arrested, interrogated and tortured upon arrival at Khartoum airport. 
Therefore, the Court finds that there would be a violation of Articles 2 and 3 in the case of 
expulsion (A.I. § 58). 
In N.A., the Court is of the view that the political activities of the applicant abroad, which are 
limited to merely participating in activities of opposition movements, are not likely to attract 
the Sudanese government’s attention. The applicant thus does not face a risk of ill-treatment 
and torture if being returned to Sudan, on account of these activities sur place (N.A. § 51). 
Comments 
First, compared to the similar case of A.A. v. Switzerland, the Court takes a step further, and 
identifies in the abstract four factors to be taken into account when assessing the risk of 
deportation of political opponents. These criteria seem to hold potential for wider application, 
beyond the Sudanese context. 
Second, the Court’s legal reasoning in N.A. may be considered unfortunate. One observation 
relates to the internal construction of the argument, the other derives from comparing the 
merits sections of N.A. and A.I. Most paragraphs in the Court’s assessments of the merits in 
the two cases are verbatim the same, or only differ as to minor/factual details. Both judgments 
were moreover issued on the same day. These circumstances support the position that, where 
the judgments do differ in their formulation, this is purposefully so. 
In N.A., the Court reaffirms that the human rights situation in Sudan is alarming, and that 
‘every person opposing or being suspected of opposing the current regime’ faces a risk of ill-
treatment. The Court also confirms that N.A. has been a member of JEM for several years, 
and assesses this membership to be ‘a risk factor for persecution’. If any person merely being 
suspected of opposing the regime is already at risk, and if N.A.’s membership of JEM is not 
contested but explicitly considered to be a risk factor, how then can the Court feel so 
confident to conclude that N.A. does not face any risk of ill-treatment if deported? 
This disconnection between reasoning and outcome becomes even more apparent when 
comparing the argumentation of the Court regarding the political engagement abroad in A.I. 
and N.A.. In the former case, the Court, after noting the applicant’s ‘not very exposed’ public 
profile, states that ‘the specific situation in Sudan should be taken into account’, in that any 
(suspected) opposition member runs a risk of ill-treatment, and that surveillance abroad is 
taking place. Why are these observations not included in N.A.? Does ‘the specific situation in 
Sudan’ not also apply to his case? Instead, the Court finds that his ‘mere participation’ in 
political activities of the opposition in exile will not have alarmed the Sudanese intelligence 
services. It is therefore hard to see how the arguments put forward by the Court support the 
non-finding of a violation in N.A., especially in light of the absolute nature of the prohibition 
of non-refoulement. 
 
